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Corporate social responsibility and discourses of conflict of interest in 
the alcohol and gambling industries: a case of post-political 
governance?1 
Abstract 
The corporate pursuit of social goals  W ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ^ŽĐŝĂůZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽƌ ‘^Z ? W has been 
subject to critique on a number of grounds.  However, a hitherto underexplored potential 
consequence of CSR has been suggested in a recent paper by Garsten & Jacobsson ('Post-Political 
Regulation: soft power and post-political visions in global governance' (2013), Critical Sociology 
39:421-437).  They suggest that CSR is part of ĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĞŶĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?
governance discourses, where ĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐŽĂůƐobscures conflicts of 
interest, subverting the open political conflict necessary for a well-functioning democracy.  This 
paper examines whether such post-political discourses  W including an outright denial of conflict of 
interest  W can be found for CSR in the alcohol and gambling industries, where conflicts of interest are 
likely to be particularly acute given the addictive nature of the goods/services in question.  Based on 
documentary analysis and interviews with those working in these industries in Italy, the Netherlands, 
the UK, and at EU-level, we find a post-political discourse wherever CSR is well-institutionalised.  In 
these discourses, alcohol/gambling industry staff deny potential conflicts of interest on the basis 
that any small benefits from sales to a small number of addicts are seen to be outweighed by the 
reputational damage that addicts cause.  Crucially, however, this coexists with another, less post-
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ^ZƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĂƐĂďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌ
CSR, while accepting some instances of possible conflict of interest.  Here interviewees make 
considerable efforts to differentiate good (sustainable) from bad (short-term) self-interest in order 
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to stress the genuineness of their own actions.  We conclude the paper by considering whether CSR 
embedded within a  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞstill hides conflicts of interests and subverts 
democratic debate, or overcomes the problems identified by Garsten & Jacobsson. 
Keywords 
Conflict of interest; CSR; post-political governance; alcohol; gambling.




The corporate pursuit of social goals  W ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ^ŽĐŝĂůZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽƌ ‘^Z ? W has been 
subject to critique on a number of grounds, ranging from the ineffectiveness of CSR initiatives per se 
to the role of CSR in providing corporate access to policymakers (see below).  However, a hitherto 
underexplored potential consequence of CSR has been suggested in a recent paper by Garsten & 
Jacobsson (2013), who suggest that there is an international trend towards  ‘post-political ? 
governance discourses  W that is, a discourse ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ďĂƚƚůĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞǀersus wider 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂƌĞƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚďǇ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ-based discourses where these actors 
work together towards a common goal.  They argue that CSR is a crucial aspect of such post-political 
governance, demonstrating (at least rhetorically) that corporate actors are part of the solution to  W 
rather than the cause of  W a wide variety of social problems.   
CSR may therefore be undesirable on the grounds that it reduces the available space for divergent 
views to be articulated within democratic processes  W yet Garsten & Jacobsson themselves accept 
the need for further empirical work to examine this in practice.  This paper undertakes such a task, 
taking alcohol and gambling as critical case studies.  While there are potential conflicts of interests 
to some degree for many ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?social actions, these are particularly acute for addictive 
goods/services where it becomes hard to sustain the assumption that individualised consumer 
choice maximises social welfare. Researchers and advocates have therefore repeatedly drawn 
attention to the conflict of interest of alcohol companies in reducing addiction-related harm, given 
(it is argued) that they profit from these social problems (see below).   
Yet despite such claims, these industries commonly undertake activities that they claim help to 
reduce addiction-related harm.  For example, the EU has set up institutionalised CSR activities in the 
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form of an Alcohol and Health Forum across all EU member states (de Bruijn 2008).  In the UK (one 
of the countries where CSR is well-developed), the present Government has initiated a 
 ‘ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĞĂů ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌƚŚĂƚŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐĂůĐŽŚŽů ?ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐĂZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ
Gambling Strategy Board funded by the British Government to oversee privately-funded CSR 
activities.  In this paper, we consider whether the discourses in which these CSR activities are 
embedded ĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶ'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞ  W as we now explain. 
Post-political governance 
ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŐĞƚƚŝŶŐďŽŐŐĞĚĚŽǁŶŝŶ ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĂůďŝĐŬĞƌŝŶŐ ?ĂďŽƵƚ^Z(Ward and Smith 2006:28), we 
here define CSR as business actions beyond core profit-making activities that are claimed to benefit 
society (and specifically here, to reduce addiction-related harm).  While there is an extensive 
literature on CSR spanning several decades (Taneja, et al. 2011), much of this takes place in the field 
of business studies/business ethics, focusing primarily on the incentives to behave responsibly 
(Orlitzky, et al. 2003) or the obligations to behave responsibly (Freeman, et al. 2004).  Alongside this, 
however, there is a more critical, sociologically-minded literature that casts doubts on how far CSR 
ĐĂŶĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŐŽŽĚ ?^ƵĐŚĚŽƵďƚƐƉĂƌƚůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŽĨ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ CSR allows corporate actors to justify ethically problematic actions to 
themselves (Costas and Kärreman 2013); but primarily this happens by enhancing corporate political 
activity, whether by increasing access to policymakers (Fooks, et al. 2013), ŚĞůƉŝŶŐ ‘ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌe 
ĚŽƵďƚ ?ĂƌŽƵŶĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ(Michaels and Monforton 2005), or more broadly by recasting 
social problems in ways that help legitimise the power of corporations (Banerjee 2008). 
Within this, there are studies that apply a critical lens to CSR specifically within the addictions field  W 
particularly on tobacco, to a lesser extent for alcohol, but rarely on gambling.  Documents made 
public following litigation against the tobacco industry in the US have revealed how both the tobacco 
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(Fooks, et al. 2011) and alcohol (Bond, et al. 2009:7) industries deliberately use CSR as a way of 
reducing the chances of future socially-motivated legislation that would restrict commercial 
freedoms and impinge on profitability, by both providing access to policymakers and helping 
reframe the issues themselves.  (These aims are also revealed in interviews with corporate actors; 
see Hawkins and Holden 2013; Yoon and Lam 2013 and below).  And beyond this, there are many 
claims that alcohol/tobacco CSR activities are ineffective or even counterproductive (e.g. Wakefield, 
et al. 2006)(SEE ALSO AUTHOR IN PRESS section 5.3.1). 
Our focus here, however, is a recent and specific claim of Garsten & Jacobsson that we are moving 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŵŽƌĞ ‘post ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? forms of regulation (Garsten and Jacobsson 2013; developing ideas in 
Jacobsson 2004). They take the ƚĞƌŵ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ĨƌŽŵŚĂŶƚĂůDŽƵĨĨĞ ?Ɛargument that open 
ideological conflict is being increasingly hidden by mainstream political parties in Europe, 
contributing to the rise of the far-right. Adapting this to explore issues of regulation and governance, 
Garsten & Jacobsson argue that  ‘regulatory attempts are increasingly premised on perceptions of 
basically harmonious social relationships ?(2013:422).  Instead of traditional forms of regulation 
where the interests of corporate actors were opposed to those of society (as expressed in 
legislation) and negotiated through the democratic process, post-political governance is the 
partnership of corporate and non-ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ‘ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?
Irrespective of the concrete CSR actions underlying them, we contend that CSR discourses are 
relevant because  ‘discourses do not simply represent reality, as experienced by a particular social 
group or institutions, but they are also dynamic, serving to construct version of reality ? (Cohen and 
Musson 2000 :33).  The particular problem with post-political governance is that  W ĂƐŝŶDŽƵĨĨĞ ?Ɛ
critique of post-political politics  W it subverts the open political conflict that is necessary for a well-
functioning democracy; as Garsten & Jacobsson put it,  ‘CSR is the deliberate inclusion of perceived 
public interest into corporate decision-making, thus reducing the available space for articulation of 
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diverging interests ? (2013:429, emphasis added).  This creates a climate in which binding and 
effective legislation is ultimately less likely.   
While CSR activities can superficially seem desirable or at worst innocuous, this account highlights a 
potentially damaging consequence of CSR for democratic debate  W yet Jacobsson & Garsten present 
limited empirical material and invite further study, a call to which we respond in this paper.  
Addictions CSR 
Within the wider framework of CSR in controversial sectors (see Yani-de-Soriano, et al. 2012), we 
take the case of addictions CSZƚŽďĞĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĐĂƐĞĨŽƌ'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞ
high level of potential conflict of interest involved (although it was necessary to exclude tobacco 
from the study, for reasons given below). Individuals use potentially addictive goods/services to gain 
ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞŽƌƌĞůŝĞǀĞƉĂŝŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚƌŝŐŐĞƌƐƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞǁĂƌĚƐǇƐƚĞŵĨŽƌƵƐĞĨƵůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ(Koob and Le 
Moal 2006).  However, a subset of consumers find that regular use leads to withdrawal symptoms, 
leading to a craving to continue harmful use of the good/service  W making it difficult to sustain the 
assumption that social welfare is maximised if decision-making is left to individuals . 
The addictive industries gain a large part of their profits from such undesirable consumption.  It has 
been suggested that 30-50% of gambling spending is accounted for by problem gamblers (e.g. Yani-
de-Soriano, et al. 2012), and that this is figure is even higher for certain types of gambling.  For 
ĂůĐŽŚŽů ? ‘ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ?ŝƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂĚĚŝĐƚĞĚ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŚĂƌŵƐ
among non-ĂĚĚŝĐƚƐ ?ůĂƌŐĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŽƚĂůĂůĐŽŚŽůƐĂůĞƐĂƌĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĨŽƌďǇ ‘ƵŶŚĞĂůƚŚǇĚƌŝŶŬƐ ?
beyond official recommended levels of acceptable risk.  For example, using figures for Great Britain 
(AUTHOR 2009), it is estimated that alcohol consumption among 18-64 year olds would fall by 55 per 
cent if all binge-drinking days were replaced by drink-free days.  It is for these reasons that many 
experts see a conflict of interest between corporate interests and public health interests.   
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ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚĚŝĐƚŝǀĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŚĂǀĞrarely been studied together  W or in 
the case of gambling CSR, barely studied at all.2  As a recent editorial in the Lancet puts it,  ‘although 
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚŽďĂĐĐŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚǁŝƚŚƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚŝƐ
irreconcilable, whether the competing interests of the alcohol, food, and drink industries are similarly 
ŝƌƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĂďůĞŝƐĚĞďĂƚĞĚ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĂƌĞůĂƌŐĞůǇƵŶƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ? (Moodie, et al. 2013:670).  This partly 
reflects the differences between them, not just in their level of addictiveness but also in their 
impacts on non-addicted consumers. For example, while low-level alcohol use is relatively low-risk, 
alcohol was recently estimated by the World Health Organization to be in the top 10 of 67 risk 
factors for disability in Western Europe and North America (Lim and al 2012 :Figure 5), and 
moreover is a contributing factor to a wide range of social problems (Klingemann and Gmel 2001).  
It is these differences  W overlaid on an underlying similarity of addiction  W that makes the 
simultaneous study of alcohol and gambling CSR particularly valuable.  Furthermore, by considering 
varied cultural contexts within high-income Western European countries, we can examine whether 
post-political discourses are equally visible in diverse settings across diverse addictions.  While we do 
ŶŽƚƚĞƐƚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ǁĞtake as our premise 'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
argument that the existence of post-political discourses is likely to be damaging to democratic 
accountability.  This stƵĚǇƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽ'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌŵŽƌĞĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ
studies of the implementation of CSR in particular areas, as well as the need for greater research on 
the role of corporate actors in alcohol policy (Hawkins, et al. 2012), gambling policy (where the 
paucity of literature is striking) ?ĂŶĚĨŽƌŵŽƌĞǁŽƌŬŝŶ ‘ĂĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?ŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ 
(Adams 2013). 




We use a multiple case study approach, where we study each of alcohol and gambling in three 
settings (the EU for both alcohol and gambling; alcohol in the Netherlands; and gambling in the UK 
and Italy).3  These countries were chosen to both capture differences in the extent of CSR discourses 
per se; and also to capture variation in cultural contexts of alcohol/ gambling.  The comparative 
study in 2012/13 is combined with data from an extensive and previously unpublished 2007 case 
study analysis by one author, focusing on alcohol CSR in the UK.  In total, this provides six case 
studies, allowing comparisons both across countries and across addictions. 
Within each case we used two sources of data: public documents/websites, and telephone/face-to-
face interviews. Documents capture the public image that actors choose to present, and are easy to 
obtain even with limited cooperation, while interviews with industry insiders are necessary in order 
to probe for richer answers on conflict of interest. The sample is focused on chief executives and 
communications/CSR managers within large companies (for alcohol, primarily producers but with 
some major retailers) and their trade/CSR bodies.  (We also spoke to key non-industry actors (NGOs, 
civil servants), although these are not the focus here).  We do not suggest that the same discourses 
would be found among smaller, non-publicly-listed companies, nor that the precise interests of each 
actor and each organisation are identical (Holden, et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the broader CSR 
discourses do not systematically vary across actors within this group of large corporations and 
corporate bodies.   
Data collection was undertaken by the present authors and international partners (NAMES 
REMOVED FOR ANONYMITY) and subject to ethical approval by (UNIVERSITY); the topic guide is 
available as Web Appendix A.  In total, our corpus includes 67 interviews, of which 44 were among 
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corporate actors, and alongside 14 document reports (each based on multiple sources).  The corpus 
was then thematically coded within NVivo 10, using a mixture of theoretically-derived codes derived 
from Garsten & Jacobsson on the representation of conflict of interest, and inductively-derived 
codes that emerged from the data.  This was supplemented by memo-ing of full 
transcripts/documents, to avoid the fracturing tendency inherent in purely thematic analyses and 
examine the discourse of each person/document as a whole.  A subset of 10 interviews were 
independently coded by both authors at the outset, to ensure clarity and consistency in coding and 
interpretation.
Results 
Post-political discourses in addictions CSR 
From this empirical material ?ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŝŶ'ĂƌƐƚĞŶĂŶĚ:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
mould can be discerned  W at least for some interviewees. Documentary analysis only partially 
unpacks this as public statements are primarily of how corporations commit to transparent, moral 
behaviour and accept the existence of addiction-related harm:  
  ‘We are keen to draw attention to the problems that can arise when an 
individual ?s gambling goes out of control ?(London Club international website, 
www.lciclubs.com) 
Accepting harm in this way implicitly also suggests that the organisation has some reason to behave 
responsibly, but stays silent on issues around conflict of interest. The denial of conflict of interest, 
however, becomes clear when industry actors respond to questions or challenges about their 
interests.  This can take place in written exchanges, such as the group of alcohol producers who 
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responded to criticism in the pages of the prominent journal Addiction to say that they  ‘see no 
contradiction ? between  ‘commercial interests and the public health goal ? (Leverton, et al. 2000:1430; 
see also Orley and Logan 2005), and is also repeatedly expressed in the interviews, never more 
strongly than the following account: 
 ‘(Angrily) /ƚƌĞĂůůǇƌĞĂůůǇĂŶŐĞƌƐŵĞƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞƐŚŽƵůĚĂůǁĂǇƐĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂ
conflict of interest with the industry saying that it is concerned about public 
ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?/ƐŝŵƉůǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞǁŚǇƉĞŽƉůĞĐĂŶ ?ƚĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƐĞĞƐǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌůǇ
that it is not in its interests to be associated with any of the downsides of its 
products. Why should it? ? (Alcohol UK20) 
In other instances, the same point is made calmly but firmly:   
 ‘We must always avoid a blame game where companies are blamed, or 
companies try and blame individuals and customers and say  ‘ǁĞůůŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚŽƵƌ
ĨĂƵůƚ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞũƵƐƚĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚhave any responsibility ?, or the 
NGOs blame the businesses for not having enough funding. It has to be a 
collective responsibility to help people ? (Gambling UK5) 
But how can these discourses dismiss the existence of conflict of interest, given that there would 
seem to be a profit from sales to addicts?  The explanation is that the discourse firstly marginalises 
conflict of interest around sales to addicted/undesirable consumers, and then presents 
countervailing bottom-line motives as outweighing any profits gained from this undesirable use, as 
we now explore.  
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Motives to be irresponsible 
In the post-political interviews, the existence of addiction and other harms is never denied  W yet 
alcohol and gambling industry CSR professionals consistently confine this problem to very small 
numbers of people. For instance, UK gambling interviewees admit that  ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŶƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞ
ŶĞƌǀŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ? about gambling (Gambling UK6), but repeatedly quote the result of the official 
Gambling Prevalence Survey ƚŚĂƚƉĂƚŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŐĂŵďůĞƌƐĂƌĞ ‘ĂƐŵĂůůŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚĚŽnot even 
amount to 1 per cent of the population. Similarly, alcohol industry CSR professionals felt that 
problem drinkers were not a major part of their market.  As one put it, summarising a widely-held 
view,  ‘the number of high risk drinkers as a percentage of the total UK population is very small ?.   
How can this be reconciled with the figures presented above, on the extent to which the 
alcohol/gambling industries gain a large part of their sales from undesirable consumption?  To probe 
this further, alcohol interviewees were asked to comment on published figures illustrating this point.  
The response was universally to reject the implied conflict of interest.  Some would accept that there 
might be conflict of interest in parts of the alcohol industry, but put forward a post-political view of 
their own role;  ‘ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞĂŶǇŵŽŶĞǇĨƌŽŵďŝŶŐĞĚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĚŽĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĨŽƌŽƵƌ
premium spirits portfolio ? (Alcohol UK41) ?zĞƚŝƚǁĂƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ƚŽƐŵĂůů
numbers of people with very severe harms (see also Hawkins and Holden 2013); those with less 
extreme consumption were not part of the definition of the problem (official definitions were 
 ‘ƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĨĂƌĐŝĐĂů ? ?. Similar views can also be seen in the gambling interviews:   
 ‘^ŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚ ?ƐŐĂŵďůŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚ ?ƐĚƌŝŶŬ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐĚƌƵŐƚĂŬŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ
ŝƚ ?ƐŐǇŵ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚ ?ƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐŝŶŐ ?ƚŽǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůǁĂǇ ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞĂƐŵĂůů
number of ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? ? ?/ŵĞĂŶŝƚĚŽĞƐŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚĂůŽƚŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?/ƚ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚǇǁĞ ?ƌĞŚĞƌĞ ? (Gambling UK2)  
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As a result ŽĨĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ƐŽŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇ, the common view was that  ‘I would have 
thought just instinctively that it seems to me that drinks industries are not going to lose huge 
amounts of profit by encouraging the problematic drinkers not to drink so much. ?  Conflict of interest 
ŝƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞĚƵĐĞĚďǇŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŝŶ ? ?ƚŚĞƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚthe good/service 
provides for the vast majority of consumers.  
 ‘When it comes to something like alcohol, there are two sides to the coin, that 
drinking in moderation is enjoyable for consumers who choose to drink, and if you 
drink irresponsibly you can harm yourself and you can harm others ? (Alcohol EU5) 
So alcohol industry staff  ‘ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇŵĂŬĞŶŝĐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞĞŶũŽǇĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞ
anything wrong with that ? ?ǁŚŝůĞĂŐĂŵďůŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ‘is to bring entertainment and 
happiness to the lives of our customers through thrilling gaming experiences ?.  While not the focus 
here, it is nevertheless important to note other aspects of the post-political discourse that go 
beyond  W yet are simultaneously intertwined with  W conflict of interest.  In the face of the 
good/service bringing widespread happiness together with demarcated harm, the responsibility for 
ensuring that a given consumer had a normal and pleasurable experience is placed squarely on the 
consumer themselves (see Hawkins and Holden 2013 among others).  As one respondent put it,  ‘/
know that [gambling] can cause addiction, I know that it can cause damage, but they are personal 
choices in the first place ? (Pan-addiction EU1). 
The role of the responsible corporate actor is therefore to help people in this process of self-
management  W crystallised in the idea of self-exclusion agreements in the gambling industry ( ‘the 
ŐĂŵďůĞƌǁŚŽǁĂŶƚƐƚŽĞǆĐůƵĚĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂůƌĞĂĚǇŚĂƐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?), but also visible in the more 
typical information-based campaigns  W where failure (addiction) is a failure of the self rather than of 
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the addictive good/service (see also Yoon and Lam 2013).  In this sense, conflict of interest becomes 
irrelevant within this discourse in the face of the sovereignty of the consumer. 
Motives to be responsible 
This ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞƐƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůůǇƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŐŽŽĚƐ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
 W yet it does not deny them.  To reach a fully post-political discourse that can represent corporate 
actors as having the same goals as non-corporate actors, there needs to be an additional motivation 
for the addictive industries to behave responsibly, and this was repeatedly expressed in the form of 
 ‘ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?.  As an alcohol industry interviewee put it,  ‘No company can survive in the long term if 
their reputation becomes more linked with the downside of alcohol misuse than with the upside of 
alcohol enjoyment ?. 
tŚŝůĞƚĂůŬŽĨ ‘ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?is widespread, its deeper meaning upon probing seems to point in two 
directions. Firstly, brands associated with harms are seen to be less desirable to consumers; for 
instance, customers  ‘will leave [casinos] ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁŽŶ ?ƚƐĂǇƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŚĂĚĂŐŽŽĚƚŝŵĞ ? (Gambling 
UK4).  Refined and controlled customer experiences could lead to better brand reputations and 
higher prices ( ‘ĚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐůĞƐƐďƵƚďĞƚƚĞƌ ?as Alcohol UK22 put it).  Secondly, though, there was the 
wider, long-term reputation of the whole industry, the need for tacit societal consent for the 
continued and unrestricted operation of the industry.  This is ŽĨƚĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐĂ ‘ůŝĐĞŶĐĞƚŽ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?, such as the following typical view:   
 ‘So for the gambling industry in the 21st century, having a social licence to 
operate as well a physical licence is quite important, and that really goes down to 
the perceived ethics of the industry by the public ? (Gambling UK1, non-industry) 
Another respondent explained this by saying,  ‘The value that we will be able to extract 
from any society is a direct reflection of the value that we offer to society ?(Gambling UK6).  
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When we probed this further, ǁŽƌƌŝĞƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ůŝĐĞŶĐĞƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?are 
often an indirect way of expressing a fear of restrictive legislation (see also Baggott 
2006:5): 
  ‘ ? ‘[There are] long-term concerns about the ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐŝŵĂŐĞĂŶĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ
way the industry is portrayed in the media, the way it ?s perceived by customers 
and so on.  Though to a certain extent, they probably all feed into legislation 
anyway, in that baƐŝĐĂůůǇ ?ŝĨƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂŝƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚŝƐŝƐĂĚŝƐŐƌĂĐĞĂŶĚ
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĚŽŶĞĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĂƚƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚŝŶƚŽ
government action.  So the ultimate fear or the ultimate driver [of CSR] is 
probably going to be legislation ? [Alcohol UK3] 
It is worth noting here that documentary analyses on alcohol and tobacco have likewise found CSR 
to be motivated by the threat of regulation (Fooks, et al. 2013; Bond, et al. 2009:7)  W but have 
presented this as if it is a hidden motive, only revealed in usually private internal documents.  Here, 
on the contrary, we find the overwhelming majority of our industry respondents revealed this to 
interviewers. It should also be noted that legislation is portrayed as undesirable, crude and 
ineffective (see e.g. Hawkins and Holden 2013), which  W along with the emphasis on personal 
responsibility and happiness (above)  W allows anti-legislative feeling to coexist with a discourse of 
meeting social goals. In the words of one non-industry respondent: 
  ‘The downsides [of alcohol] are viewed as unfortunate incidents [side effects]  W 
which need to be tackled, but are usually approached gently, with gloves; it 
ŵƵƐƚŶ ?ƚďĞĚŽŶĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ŝƚŵƵƐƚŶ ?ƚŐŽĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞƌ ƐƚƐ ?
(Alcohol NL8, Non-industry)  
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Summarising this discourse, we can see that potential conflict of interest is denied because  W it is 
claimed  W any small benefits from sales to problem consumers (confined to a small number of 
addicts) are far outweighed by the reputational damage that is caused by the visibility of problem 
consumers.  Hence the claim that  ‘the gambling industry in general  ? ? ? has absolutely no interest in 
making money out of very few who may have gambling problems ? (Gambling EU3).  Rather than 
ŵĂŬŝŶŐŵŽŶĞǇŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?ŵŝƐĞƌǇ ?ƚhese industries present themselves as having the 
happiness of their customers at their heart, and therefore having the same aims as other actors to 
help consumers navigate the risk of potential addiction.  If this was the only evident discourse, then 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞƚŽďĞƐĂŝĚ ?'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨƉŽƐƚ-political governance 
discourses would be borne out in the potentially difficult case of alcohol/gambling CSR.   
Beyond the post-political  
However, alongside this post-political discourse we see another discourse, which accepted potential 
conflict of interest while also incorporating elements of the post-political discourse.  Here agreement 
becomes contingent rather than universally assumed, a matter of finding areas of common ground 




community and the alcoholic drinks industry can work together to reduce alcohol 
related harm ? (Rae 1993) 
dŚŝƐŶĞĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĚ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ǁĂƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐŵĂŶǇŽĨŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ:  
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 ‘ ? ‘If you fundamentally have a shared goal from the beginning, no matter how 
ŶĂƌƌŽǁƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚ ?ƐƐŵĂůů ?ĂŶĚǇŽƵƐĂǇ ‘ůĞƚ ?ƐĨŽĐƵ ŽŶƚŚĂƚ ? ?ĂŶĚǇŽƵƐƚĂƌƚ
ǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĐĂŶĚŽƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĂƚĂŶĚǇŽƵďƵŝůĚƚŚĞƚƌƵƐƚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŚŽǁ
partnerships should work ? (Alcohol EU17) 
 ‘/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƐƚŝůůĂůŽƚŵŽƌĞǁĞĐĂŶĚŽũŽŝŶƚůǇ ? ? ?] Iƚ ƐƐƚŝůůǀĞƌǇƉĂƚĐŚǇ ?ĂŶĚ/
ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?ƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ǁĞ
just have to sort of learn together ?(Gambling UK3) 
This discourse is heterogeneous in the sense that different actors saw this common ground as more 
or less extensive; some believed that  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůŽƚŵŽƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĂŶƵŶĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ
really ? (Alcohol UK3), while others conversely argued that  ‘the overlap [in interests] is small ? (Alcohol 
UK20).  Yet the more important point is that this discourse consistently sees the common ground as 
not total, so that the convergence of interests is incomplete.  
This differs from the purely post-political discourse, but this does not stem from the underlying 
foundations that we have already explored.  Instead, the difference comes from small gaps in the 
power of each of these arguments in which the possibility of divergent interests could be articulated.  
Hence some alcohol respondents recognised that there are some health issues where it could be 
argued that it was necessary for many people to drink less (rather than just an extreme group of 
addicted drinkers), and this is something where the alcohol industry would find a common interest 
more challenging.   
Alongside this, there is a recognition  W often implicit, occasionally explicit  W that there were limits to 
the motives to be responsŝďůĞ ?dŚĞ ‘ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨďƌĂŶĚƐŵĂǇďĞdamaged by responsible 
behaviour if this goes against consumer preferences; one interviewee claimed that when  ‘one pub 
chain banned happy hours and their sales went down.  Customers, they want that kind of thing, 
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thĞƌĞ ?ƐŚƵŐĞĚĞŵĂŶĚŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ? (Alcohol UK17) ?ŶĚĐƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ? ‘ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?is not a simple reflection 
of activities that genuinely help social welfare. The public and policymakers may not be able (or 
willing) to recognize the myriad of efforts done in line with CSR in a given territory, and may be 
swayed by easy headlines in the media: 
 ‘Iƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚŝŶƐĂŶĞŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ǇŽƵƌĞĂůůǇŐĞƚƌĞǁĂƌĚĞĚŵŽƌĞĨŽƌ
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǇŽƵƉƌŽďĂďůǇĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞĂŶĚƐŚŽǁĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ [like putting 
messages on labels] ?We tried to add some substance to [the labelling], but had 
ǁĞŶŽƚĚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĐĂƌĞĚ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐƚŝůůŐŝǀĞŶƵƐ
ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞŬŝŶĚŽĨƐĐƌĞǁĞĚƵƉ ? [Alcohol EU9] 
One alcohol industry respondent is unusually explicit about the implications of this: 
 ‘If I was being perfectly honest, I suppose that the industry might be more likely to 
act to address a perceived problem, if you know what I mean, than to address a 
real problem, if addressing that real problem did not actually tackle perception ? 
[Alcohol UK3] 
This raises the possibility that CSR is presented as a matter of managing external perceptions 
without a genuine commitment to social outcomes  W sometimes described in the wider literature as 
 ‘ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ  ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ ?^Z(Christmann and Taylor 2006).  Yet it is difficult for CSR 
professionals in an interview to describe their own work as symbolic.  People understandably prefer 
not to take courses of action that they themselves see as ethically problematic, and therefore find 
ǁĂǇƐŽĨ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ?ƐƵĐŚĚŝĨficulties in order to sustain their view of themselves as an ethical 
person (Heath 2008).  Moreover, a symbolic CSR discourse is likely to alienate non-industry actors, 
and the power of the CSR discourse might be lost (as shown in Yoon, et al. 2006). As one alcohol 
non-industry actor says,  ‘if I were to engage with anybody who fell into the cynical [profit-oriented] 
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category, I would walk awaǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ ? (Alcohol UK19, non-industry).  Or in 
another ?Ɛ words:  
/ƚ ?ƐŵƵĐŚĞĂƐŝĞƌ  ? ? ?ƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƚŚĞǇƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽ
agree on at least ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚĂŶŽŶĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞǀĞƌǇŚŽƐƚŝůĞ
and difficult. So that again goes to why [this company] wants to be seen as a 
responsible business, because it opens doors, it just makes conversations easier, 
with not just politicians, but our own customers, the media, regulators. (Gambling 
UK5)  
To resolve this tension, it is striking the efforts that many respondents make to distinguish 
themselves from symbolic CSR  W often explicitly contrasting their own approach to a more cynical 
one:  
 ‘/ƚŚŝŶŬĂůůƚŚĞďŝŐƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ĂƌĞŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŚŝŶŐ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬ
its PR.  /ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?ƐƌĞĂů ? ?(Alcohol UK6) 
This genuineness is justified in one of two ways. One is to emphasise the genuine moral commitment 
of CSR professionals to reducing harm, which came up repeatedly during the interviews, who nearly 
all said that they  ‘are genuinely trying to do the right thing ?,  ‘want to make a difference to society ?, 
or want to  ‘do good ?, as ultimately they are also  ‘ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŚĂǀĞŬŝĚƐ ?. The other justification is to 
make a subtle distinction between sustainable bottom-line motivations and short-term bottom-line 
motivations. For example, several respondents were uncomfortable with any suggestion that they 
only acted responsibly because of their self-interest.  Yet, after further probing, they were not 
suggesting that businesses act responsibly in ways that harmed their profitability; rather, they 
wanted to be very clear they were talking about  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ƐĞůĨ-interest.  That is, they spoke about 
genuine, sustainable self-interest, in contrast to symbolic, cynical, short-term self-interest (the  ‘ĨůǇ-
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by-ŶŝŐŚƚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? who wanted to make a  ‘ƋƵŝĐŬƉƌŽĨŝƚ ? [Alcohol UK9]).  Likewise, in the 
following quote it is striking how two different bottom-line motivations are explicitly contrasted: 
 ‘/ĨǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŝŶƚŚŝƐũƵƐƚĨŽƌĂƋƵŝĐŬǁŝŶŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŚĞŶǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŝŶŝƚĨŽƌƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐ
reason; you have to be in it because it makes business sense ? [Alcohol EU10]   
At times, respondents were at pains to emphasise how they fell on the right side of a very fine line. 
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƋƵŽƚĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŽŶůǇĂƐƵďƚůĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŐŽŽĚ
ƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƉĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐďĂĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐĞĞĂƐƚŚĞright motive to be responsible:  
 ‘[On why CSR takes place] People disapprove of us, therefore we should do lots of 
ŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŽŚĞůƉĐŚĂŶŐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶƐŽŵĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ƚŚĞ^ZǁŝůůďĞĂĨŝŐůĞĂĨ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ŝƚ ?ƐWZ ?ŝĨǇŽƵůŝŬĞ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬǁŝƚŚƵƐ ?ŝƚ ?Ɛ
definitely a sense that ƚŚŝƐŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇũƵƐƚƉĂƌƚŽĨŚŽǁǁĞĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?^Žŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚ
ĂďŽƵƚƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŐŽŽĚƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƉĨŽƌĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐďĂĚ ?ŝƚ ?Ɛ
actually about saying,  ‘we fervently believe that our contribution to society is 
positive, and it has to be positive ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝĨŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĞŶǁĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŐŽƚĂ
business ?[Gambling UK6] 
^ƵŵŵĂƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵ'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?
:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-political: shared interests are restricted to certain areas of common 
ground, while conflict of interest remains.  Yet these discourses are none the less pulled in a post-
political direction to the extent that conflict of interest is denied as it applies to the activities that 
they undertake, in order to stress the genuineness of what they themselves do.  This is an 
understandable step, as there is no discursive space in which CSR activities can be seen to genuinely 
pursue social goals while simultaneously accepting that there is a substantial conflict of interest 
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involved.  We return to the critical ŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĨŽƌ
democratic debate in our conclusion below. 
Differences between case studies  
So far, we have spoken about addictions discourses without drawing attention to differences 
between countries and between addictions.  We therefore here focus explicitly on these differences, 
and the extent to which our findings can be generalised to a wider theoretical account. 
Differences between alcohol and gambling across countries 
Both the common ground and post-political discourses are found across our case studies for both 
alcohol and gambling, despite certain distinctive features of discourses mentioned above (e.g. the 
extent to which harms occur in non-addicted consumers, and whether harms are purely social or 
health harms are also present).  However, they are restricted to settings in which CSR is well-
established, and for which there is a degree of trust between the research team and the corporate 
actors.   
This does not fully apply to the gambling industry in Italy, where a CSR discourse appeared to be in 
flux at the time of the interviews in the context of the exponential expansion of the industry from a 
low base.  CSR professionals were reluctant to make comments at a sensitive time when they have 
not yet formulated their own positions, when sharing responsibility is still being debated (Bertagni, 
et al. 2007) ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŝƐŽŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ (e.g. praise for 
bar owners refusing to have slot machines) rather than corporate policies.  This is not helped by the 
historic position of gambling in Italy as connected to illegal organisations, which makes these issues 
even more politically difficult and opaque, and resulted in several interviewees only participating on 
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condition of control over the transcripts, which they then edited heavily into a written statement.     
The distinctiveness of the Italian case may well be short-lived; there have been rapid developments 
in gambling governance in Italy, especially with regard to the entrance into force of the Balduzzi 
decree in 2012 that inter alia recognises pathological gambling as a disease for the first time. 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞǁĞŵĂǇĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ
via the Open Method of Coordination will further push national governance towards an 
institutionalisation of CSR. 
There are also some differences in the Dutch alcohol case due to the fact that our research partner is 
a well-known critic of the alcohol industry; every single alcohol industry company/organisation 
refused to take part.  Using the considerable amount of documentary data that was obtained 
instead, however, we can still see similar elements of a post-political discourse to alcohol in the UK 
and EU, to the extent that this is observable in documents. The variable ease with which we could 
conduct interviews draws attention to the inter-relationship between discourse and research-ability: 
those who reject the idea of CSR (or who do CSR symbolically) would be expected to be less likely to 
take part in research, particularly when the researchers are perceived to be unsympathetic to the 
industry.  We discuss the implications of this in more detail elsewhere (AUTHORS, In Preparation).  
Tobacco as a special case 
At the outset we aimed to study tobacco alongside alcohol and gambling.  However, the conflict of 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŽďĂĐĐŽŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇŚŝŐŚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŽďĂĐĐŽĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŝŶ
ƚŚĞ^ZďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?(Palazzo and Richter 2005:398).  The t,K ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐŽŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ
Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control state explicitly that  ‘ƚhere is a 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚŝƌƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĂďůĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚŽďĂĐĐŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛinterests and public health 
ƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?and furthermore that  ‘ ?Őovernments should] to the extent possible, regulate 
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activities described as  ‘socially responsible ?ďǇƚŚĞƚŽďĂĐĐŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ? As a result, we found it almost 
impossible to speak to people in the tobacco industry, and it is clear that a post-political discourse is 
not tenable in this context.  Instead, the main importance of the tobacco example in our data is as a 
salutary tale for the other addictive industries; avoiding the fate of tobacco is mentioned several 
times by those working in other industries as a motivating factor for their own activities. 
Conclusions 
/ŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌǁĞŚĂǀĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ
are becoming increasingly post-political, premised on harmonious relationships rather than conflicts 
between diverging interests.  We examined the alcohol and gambling industries in Europe as critical 
case studies for this argument, as consensus-based discourses are likely to be hardest to sustain 
when facing the potential conflict of interest in selling an addictive (and sometimes more broadly 
harmful) good/service.  The empirical material is based on six individual case studies, of 
alcohol/gambling each in three contexts (across the UK, Netherlands, Italy and EU-level governance), 
using both individual interviews and publicly available documentary material. 
In support of Garsten & Jacobsson, we found evidence of a post-political discourse where the 
existence of even a slight of conflict of interest is denied.  Rather than viewing the production or sale 
of an addictive good/service as inherently involving conflicts of interest, this discourse minimises the 
extent of the incentives to be irresponsible (by demarcating a small proportion of addicts within 
which all problems are located), and sets these against the much stronger incentives to be 
responsible (primarily the long-term threat of severe regulation if public opinion becomes hostile).  
This discourse is visible across both alcohol and gambling, across several settings in which CSR is 
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well-established (the UK, Netherlands and at EU-level), although to a lesser extent  in settings where 
CSR is yet to take root (Italy).   
Yet this is not the only CSR discourse we found in the mature CSR cĂƐĞƐ ?ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?
discourse is also apparent, which recognises some areas of conflict of interest, and therefore focuses 
CSR and partnership on areas in which common interests could be found.  While the limits of the 
motivations to be responsible are implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) recognised, corporate actors 
nevertheless stress the genuineness of their activities, partly because of their personal moral 
commitments to social goals, and partly by differentiating good (long-term) from bad (short-term) 
incentives to be responsible.  In other words, interviewees present their own CSR activities as 
unaffected by conflicts of interest in ways that are similar to post-political discourses, but maintain a 
space in which conflict of interest in general could be discussed.  
The magmatic conditions for negotiation created in this interstice is, in our view, particularly 
interesting to bring to scholarƐ ? and policymakers ? attention, as it raises the question of whether the 
common ground discourse is sufficient to avoid the anti-democratic tendency to marginalise dissent, 
ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽĨ'ĂƌƐƚĞŶ ?:ĂĐŽďƐƐŽŶ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-political discourse.  As Jacobsson (2004:85) 
puts it, in post-political discourses we find that CSR activities  ‘are given a status beyond political 
contestation, being viewed as morally and ethically sound, and, hence, difficult to question in 
principle. ?   Garsten & Jacobsson do not suggest that this is an inevitable feature of CSR, but rather 
that  ‘while consensus as an end-result of a process is not problematic, consensus as the premise at 
the point-of-departure is ?  W or put another way, that  ‘compromises are possible and necessary but 
should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation ? (Garsten and Jacobsson 
2013:423).   
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This would seem to imply that the common ground discourse is strongly preferable to the post-
political one, at least in terms of its impact on the nature of democratic debate.  A similar view is 
even mentioned in one of our interviews: 
 ‘The [alcohol company] is not a public health operator and probably sometimes 
there is this confusion which is not voluntarily noted by operators in general that 
basically they are taking part in the debate as if they were from the public health 
side ?  (Alcohol EU5, 2007) 
Our findings are suggestive  W yet it is unclear whether these small discursive openings to debate 
conflict of interest result in meaningful differences in political debate and the policy.  To investigate 
this requires investigation of the policy process itself, building on the present analysis of the 
discursive constructions of industry actors. It will therefore be left to future research (including the 
overarching project of which this paper is a part) to uncover whether different CSR discourses have 
different implications over the course of alcohol/gambling policymaking.   
Finally, the concept of the post-political offers a new lens with which to see debates in the 
addictions field.  Jacobsson has noted that  ‘one can imagine courses of action where actors conform 
and adapt in some respects and preserve their interests and initial positions  W refusing conformity  W 
in others ? (2004:359). It is possible to interpret the responses of those who reject CSR on a priori 
grounds as an act of resistance to the post-political; an attempt to reassert that different actors have 
different interests, and that these should be openly debated within democratic processes.  For 
instance, n the alcohol field there are ongoing battles about the appropriate role of the alcohol 
industry, with organizations such as the Global Alcohol Policy Alliance attacking the claims about 
shared interests made by the Global Alcohol Producers Group. In this way, the idea of the post-
ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƐĂƚŽŽůŽĨ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-political ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? 
Page 27 
 
political makes visible the true nature of this debate, not just as a conflict between those with 
different values, but as a conflict about the very existence of these different values at all.   




1 Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Katherine Smith and colleagues at the Global Public Health 
Unit at the University of Edinburgh for invaluable comments on an earlier presentation, to 
participants at the 39th Kettil Bruun Society conference in Kampala, and to Ben Hawkins. Thanks too 
to the case study partners for this project for data collection (DETAILS REMOVED FOR ANONYMITY). 
The research has received funding from (DETAILS REMOVED FOR ANONMITY). 
2 The few papers on gambling CSR are primarily discussions of the moral responsibility of the 
gambling industry (e.g. Yani-de-Soriano, et al. 2012) or analyses of CSR reporting (Jones, et al. 2009). 
3 This is a part of a larger multiple case design that includes tobacco and food, where each case study 
is studied at EU level and in two countries. 
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